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Survivor Benefits and the Gender Tax-Gap in 
Public Pension Schemes 




Since its inception, the traditional form of providing survivor benefits through public 
pension schemes has lost much of its legitimacy. As a result of fundamental changes in 
marriage behaviour and the typical division of labour between married spouses, offering 
non-contributory benefits of this kind can not only be seen as inequitable. Since they 
usually substitute for non-derived pension entitlements based on the survivant spouse’s 
own contributions, they can also lead to incentive effects, especially for married women 
with some degree of labour force attachment, that appear to be far from optimal. The 
present paper highlights this problem based on empirical estimates regarding the wage 
elasticities of labour supply for German females vs males and shows how it could be 
resolved by installing a joint annuitisation of a given couple’s pension entitlements. 
 
JEL Code: H55, J16, J22. 
















 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Next to old-age and disability pensions, survivor beneﬁts form part of the tradi-
tional beneﬁt package provided by most existing public pension schemes. In the
German Statutory Pension Scheme, the earliest public pension scheme in the
industrialised world, widows’ and orphans’ pensions were added with a small
delay (in 1904, while the scheme was set up in 1889; see Frerich and Frey 1993,
114). But since the early 20th century, they are a standard type of beneﬁts
that spouses and young children who outlive their breadwinners are entitled
to receive without any very restrictive qualifying conditions and without the
insured individual having paid any other than the regular contributions. Later
on, this design has been exported to many other countries. In most cases, for
reasons of legal non-discrimination, widowers’ pensions have been introduced
more recently as an additional category of survivor beneﬁts.1
The present paper mainly concentrates on widows’ pensions and on the stan-
dard case where these are paid to women who have reached, or are close to, their
own retirement phase. The problems it is going to highlight are relevant for pen-
sions paid to partners, not children, of an insured individual and they relate to
labour supply decisions taken by these partners during earlier stages of their life
cycle. Orphans’ pensions as well as pensions paid to mothers who have to take
care of small children are thus out of our focus. In addition — in spite of legal
entitlements that are uniform since 1986 — 92.7% of all widows’ and widowers’
pensions paid out by the German Statutory Pension Scheme eﬀectively accrue
to widows, their average monthly amount being about 2.5 times higher than
average widowers’ beneﬁts.2 The reasons for these strong asymmetries are that
women are usually younger than their husbands; that, in any case, their life
expectancy is signiﬁcantly longer;3 and that their husbands still are typically
acting as primary earners, building up own pension entitlements by which their
claims on widowers’ pensions are reduced and often fall to zero, even if the
relevant contingency arises.
In spite of what was just said, there has been a substantial change in the
division of labour between women and men within a given household over the
last decades, with a continuous increase in female labour force participation and
a notable reduction in the gender wage gap observed earlier on. As a result of
these changes that are common across most industrialised countries, providing
beneﬁts for surviving spouses has become more and more obsolete, in Germany
and elsewhere, over time. Figure 1 illustrates these trends, comparing labour-
force participation rates and wages for females and males in West Germany, as
well as their impact on average, non-derived pension entitlements that is becom-
ing eﬀective, with some delay, within the German Statutory Pension Scheme.
1For an up-to-date survey of relevant rules for the countries of the EU-15, the US, and
Switzerland, see Fenge et al. (2003, 61—67).
2See Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (2003, 147f. und 165).
3According to the “Life table 2000—02” (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004), contingent life
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Fig. 1: Labour-force participation, wages and pension beneﬁts of women
(West-Germany, 1960—2000)
The main objections to how survivor beneﬁts are currently being assessed
are (a) that they can lead to over-provision in cases of married individuals
where both partners have built up some amount of pension entitlements based
on own contributions; (b) that they do not really substitute for rules addressing
as u ﬃcient level of beneﬁts for parents, especially mothers, who spent a lot of
time and other resources on rearing children, thus contributing to the future
funding of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes; (c)t h a tt h e yh a v ec e a s e dt o
be a fair insurance against the risk of leaving behind dependant family members
and instead have become a mechanism for redistributing resources from those
who never marry to married couples with wives who are not working (Kolb
1985; Wagner 1985; Rolf and Wagner 1990).
If the traditional form of providing survivor beneﬁts has come under attack
because of its redistributive features, their incentive eﬀects should have become
problematic as well. This is what the present paper mainly looks at, concen-
trating on how pension entitlements typically collected in the German Statu-
tory Pension Scheme aﬀect the work incentives for married females vs males.
An important intermediate result is that the “implicit wage tax” that is eﬀec-
tively involved in any unfunded pension scheme is usually higher for married
women than for their husbands. Using a simple theoretical model and simu-
lations regarding the implicit tax rates in the German public pension scheme,
section 2 explains that this “gender tax gap” is mainly due to the way how,
in this scheme, survivor beneﬁts are being assessed.4 In the light of empirical
4If survivor beneﬁts were absent, implicit tax rates falling on women should, ceteris paribus,
be lower than those for males. At least, with uniform contribution rates and a uniform way
3estimates regarding the wage elasticity of labour supply for women and men,
section 3 investigates whether this particular tax structure could be in line with
the fundamental rules of an optimal taxation of wage earnings. As the result is
negative, section 4 discusses a possible solution that would make the incentive
problem disappear but still provides an option for married couples to secure a
level of pension beneﬁts for the surviving spouse which may exceed his or her
own, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements.
2S u r v i v o r b e n e ﬁts and the tax implied in pub-
lic pay-as-you-go pensions: a simple model
In a stylised model that concentrates on what is essential for the following dis-
cussion, average households are considered to be composed by two individuals
(married to each other), one a male(m) and the other a female (f). The two
types of individuals are diﬀerentiated by their life expectancy while in retire-
ment. In each case, the expected lenght of the retirement period is measured as
af r a c t i o na of the (ﬁxed) length of the active period of life. It is assumed that
αf > αm and, in any case, that 0 < αi < 1, i ∈ {m,f}.I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e
contingent life expectancy of a women entering retirement is higher than that of
her husband. For simplicity, mortality risks while still being active are entirely
neglected here; diﬀerences between the two spouses regarding their age or the
timing of their retirement could be reﬂected, up to a point, in the diﬀerentiation
of α.
Actually, we so not bother to give the multi-dimensional intra-household
decision problem much structure. What really matters is that we assume labour-
supply decisions by each partner to correspond to a “male-chauvinist” model
that appears to be largely ﬁt t i n gt ot h ee m p i r i c a ld a t au s e di ns e c t i o n3 .I nt h i s
kind of a model, women are choosing their labour supply taking as given labour
supply and net life-time earnings of their husbands. Apart from this feature, we
simply assume the spouses to maximise their utilities in such a way that this
can be represented by an aggregate utility function
ut = u(ct,z t+1,1 − lm
t ,1 − l
f
t ) → max! (1)
Here, utility of the two household members is a function of goods consumed
during the active life span and in the retirement period, ct and zt+1, respectively
(both aggregated across the household), and leisure consumed individually by
the husband and the wife while thy are still active, 1 − lm
t and 1 − l
f
t .
At the household-level, the intertemporal budget constraint for both the





















of assessing beneﬁts, this is what should be expected to result from the higher life expectancy
of females.
4I.e., goods consumption in t and t +1must be nourished from net life-time
earnings of both spouses that are determined by their gross wage rates, Wi
t,
labour supply, li
t, the contribution rate of the pension scheme, τt,a n dt h ep e n -
sion beneﬁts accruing in the retirement period, pi
t+1.T o m a k e p e r i o d - t +1
amounts of money comparable to those in period t, they are discounted by the
interest factor 1+rt+1. Ex post and with respect to paying for the couple’s
life-time consumption, equation (2) is certainly correct. But if we want to look
at individual labour-supply decisions that are taken sequentially by each part-
ner — the husband taking the lead — and see how these can be inﬂuenced by the
deﬁnition of pension beneﬁts, household-level aggregation by which important
eﬀects cancel out is eﬀectively a bit misleading. We therefore have to separate
things now a little more carefully, at least with respect to how each spouses net
wages are determined.
In a pay-as-you-go pension scheme that strongly links beneﬁts to earlier
contributions, such as the German Statutory Pension Scheme, beneﬁts can be
determined based on a factor reﬂecting the internal rate of return on contribu-
tions, 1+ρt+1, that should be uniform across insured individuals belonging to
the same age cohort. In addition, what matters for the size of pi
t+1 is the length
of the retirement period, hence life expectancy αi;t h ed e ﬁnition of survivor ben-
eﬁts that are derived from beneﬁt entitlements of the partner faced with shorter
life expectancy; and the rules that govern what happens when own, non-derived
pension entitlements for the surviving partner and survivor beneﬁts coincide.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ea s s u m et h er e l e v a n ts t r u c t u r eo fb e n e ﬁts to be as follows:
pm
























Here, pension beneﬁts that can be attributed to the husband’s contributions,
pm
t+1, include his own old-age pension beneﬁts paid for the period αm as well
as derived survivor beneﬁts paid for another period of αf − αm.T h el a t t e ra r e
being assessed as a fraction of 0 < γ < 1 of the original beneﬁts — in line with
the German system where current rules set a corresponding factor at 0.55.A s
long as the husband is still alive, his wife is entitled to receive old-age pension
beneﬁts of her own that are only linked to her own contributions. Once she
is widowed, however, her own, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements are reduced
against the survivor beneﬁts that are also becoming eﬀective. The one-for-one
reduction that is assumed in (4) overstates the actual rules applied in Germany,5
but the results are qualitatively unaﬀected by this simplifaction. However, we
need to distinguish two cases now: If the widow’s own beneﬁt entitlements
turn out to be smaller than the survivor beneﬁts included in (3), the former is
5Currently, the German pension law deﬁnes a threshold amount of own, non-derived en-
titlements that are exempted from the reduction. This threshold amount is diﬀerentiated
between West and East Germany and increases with the number of children the survivor has
raised. Higher beneﬁts are reduced by 40% per Euro of survivor beneﬁts that the individual
is entitled to receive as well.
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t =0 ); if own beneﬁt entitlements exceed the amount of survivor beneﬁts,







Using (3) and (4) to determine eﬀective net wage rates wi
t for both spouses,
taking into account not only contributions paid to the pension scheme but also
















































The terms τt(1 − ...) included in (5) to (7) represent diﬀerentiated rates of an
“implicit” (wage) tax that is next to automatically imposed on insured individu-
als through their mandatory participation in a pay-as-you-go pension scheme. In
a system with earnings-related beneﬁts, these tax rates are positive, but smaller
than contribution rates, mainly because the internal rate of return, ρt+1,i s
usually smaller the interest rate, rt+1, used for discounting. The speciﬁcf o r m u -
las obtained here also incorporate a system of survivor beneﬁts which largely
corresponds to the rules sketched above.6,7 In the following, we will call these








Case 1 („f1”) implies that the widow’s own beneﬁt entitlements become im-
material during the period of survivorhood; for a woman falling in this category,
the implicit tax rate will therefore be strictly higher than in case 2 („f2”), where
individual, non-derived beneﬁt entitlements are not entirely oﬀ-set through sur-
vivor beneﬁts. In this case, the implicit tax rate will decrease more and more,
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the rate converges to the implicit tax rate for an unmarried woman, the latter
being only determined by her life expectancy.8
What is more interesting, however, is a comparison between implicit tax
rates falling on married women vs men. While what we have just said imlies
6For an in-depths discussion of the concept of “implicit taxes” involved in pay-as-you-go
public pension schemes, see Fenge and Werding (2003).
7Basically, the tax structure we are characterising here is relevent in many countries other
than Germany as well. We will return to this issue at the end of this section, looking brieﬂy
at the U.S. and the UK.
8In our framework, and assuming that the life expectancy of females is not aﬀected by



























t will usually be even



















In other words, implicit tax rates for married women will always be higher than
those for their husbands, if the survivor-beneﬁt factor exceeds the women’s




t would have to
be 122.2% of Wm
t lm
t for this condition to become binding. Taking the current
relative female—male wage rates displayed in ﬁgure 1 (75% to 70%)a sar o u g h
approximation for the ratios of earnings in an average household — still neglecting
higher wage gaps observed in the past, plus typical diﬀerences in the life-time
amount of labour supplied by married women and men that continue to exist —
there is considerable leeway before the above condition will be violated in more
than some exceptional cases.
The result that the implicit tax rate involved in public pay-as-you-go pen-
sions is higher for married women than for their husbands — because of the exis-
tence of survivor beneﬁts and how they interact with own, non-derived beneﬁt
entitlements — is not an artifact of our simpliﬁed model. This can be conﬁrmed
by simulations which incorporate the actual rules of how surivor beneﬁts are
being assessed in Germany. Amending earlier calculations that focused on im-
plicit tax rates for (male) individuals who were assumed to act as “principal
earners” of their households (Thum and Weizsäcker 2000; Fenge and Werding
2004),9 we construct stylised earnings proﬁles for their wives reﬂecting on-going
changes in average female labour-force participation and in the average gender
wage gap for each year covered by the simulations;10 we also take into account
that married women are usually younger than their husbands (by about three
years) and that they tend to live much longer (see footnote 3).
The simulation results exhibited in ﬁgure 2 add a little more detail to our
theoretical observations. In particular, they show that, mainly because of their
higher life expectancy, implicit tax rates for married women can be lower than
those for men as long as their own beneﬁt entitlements are so small that they
are exempted, fully or to a large extent, from the reduction against survivor
beneﬁts. But as female labour-force participation increases and the gender wage
gap shrinks, the reduction of own beneﬁt entitlements during survivorhood is
likely to increase implicit tax rates for married women — in the graph: for average
women born starting from 1965 — beyond those for their husbands.11
9The simulations presented here also take into account the most recent pension reform
enacted in 2004.
10For the future development of female labour-force participation, we use a scenario that
is based on assumptions made for a number of long-term simulations commissioned by the
German government (see Kommission “Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen
Sicherungssysteme” 2003; Werding and Kaltschütz 2005). Regarding the wage gap, we as-
sume that is goes down from a current 25% (blue-collar workers in manufacturing, see ﬁgure
1) to about 15% until 2050.






























Married men                          
(''standard pensioners'')
Married women (average fem.
LFP rate; average earnings)
     * In percent of life-time gross earnings.                                        Source: CESifo Pension Model (Version 2004).    
Fig. 2: Implicit taxes in the German Statutory Pension Scheme for married
individuals (born 1937—2001)
The speciﬁc rules applied in other countries are diﬀerent from the German
ones. In most cases, however, the tax structure that they generate is similar.
U.S. Social Security, for instance, with its weaker link between contributions
and pension beneﬁts (through a formula that converts a 35-years’ average of
indexed earnings into monthly beneﬁt payments at degressive rates) implies that
implicit tax rates vary inversely with life-time earnings. This should reduce the
diﬀerence between tax rates for primary earners (whose beneﬁt entitlements
include those for survivor beneﬁts) and secondary earners (whose beneﬁts are
set oﬀ through survivor beneﬁts), but need not make it disappear. In addition,
Social Security oﬀers “spouse beneﬁts” for dependant partners that are payable
while the insured individual is still alive. As they also substitute for own beneﬁt
entitlements of second earners (on a one-for-one basis), they can stronly increase
implicit tax rates for married women when compared to those of their husbands.
Even the UK State Pension system (with earnings-related contributions, but
ﬂat-rate beneﬁts that are only diﬀerentiated by the number of qualifying years)
involves some elements of an extra-tax for married women. Paying the minimum
amount of contributions for a given year to become covered may not make
sense for women whose resulting beneﬁt entitlements are too small to become
eﬀective in the presence of spouse beneﬁts, which also exist here, and survivor
beneﬁts. Only in a pension system where beneﬁts are entirely lump-sum, not
even diﬀerentiated pro rata temporis, implicit tax rates were always equal to the
titlements, while giving up claims on survivor beneﬁts, between spouses who married after
January, 1st 2001. Using this option makes the incentive problems disappear that we are
interested in, but it does not solve all problems of old-age provision for (married) couples; see
section 4.
8(explicit) contribution rates and, hence, uniform across all members of a given
age cohort, including married spouses (while beneﬁts are a pure transfer).
3 Optimal taxation and the gender tax gap
It should be noted that the existence of an implicit tax rate as such — and
even its increasing time trend that shows up in the simulations run for ﬁgure
2 — is not necessarily indicating a fundamental ineﬃciency involved in pay-as-
you-go pension schemes,12 even if it is suited to discourage insured individuals,
irrespective of their gender, from labour force participation. What is potentially
problematic here, however, is the tax structure derived in the previous section,
with tax rates that are systematically higher for married women who show some
degree of labour force attachment than for their husbands.
Basically, implicit tax rates are an instrument required for keeping the im-
plicit debt involved in pay-as-you-go pensions — i.e., the present value of out-
standing beneﬁts that are linked to all past and present contributions — on a
sustainable time path. For instance, to avoid that this debt explodes as a per-
centage of current GDP, the internal rate of return on contributions must fall
short of the market rate of interest over the long run. By its demographic and
economic fundamentals, ρt+1 is generally restricted to the growth rate of the
economy’s aggregate payroll, or total taxable wage earnings, such that the above
condition should be met.13
Considerations of this kind ﬁx the implicit tax which has to be imposed
on a given age cohort participating in a pay-as-you-go pension scheme as an
absolute amount. In terms of our model — assuming, for simplicity, that all








t .( 8 )
I tr e m a i n sa no p e nq u e s t i o n ,t h o u g h ,w h i ch structure of tax rates — here: what
ϑ
i
ts — should ideally be chosen to yield this speciﬁed tax revenue.
This question is simply another application of the theory of optimal taxation
that investigates the design of taxes and tax rates by which a given amount of
tax revenue can be levied in such a way that welfare losses imposed on the
individuals aﬀected are minimised. Important standard results that are also
relevant here were already provided by Sandmo (1974; 1987) or Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, ch. 12). An application to implicit taxes involved in pay-as-
you-go public pension schemes can be found in Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding
12Cf. the seminal papers by Breyer (1989) and Fenge (1995). Sinn (2000) surveys the
entire debate on the eﬃciency of unfunded pension systems that has been triggered by these
contributions. The implications of increasing tax rates for younger age cohorts that are mainly
due to current demographic change are discussed in Fenge and Werding (2004).
13Considered in a little more detail, the relevant ρ for each cohort that is covered in a pay-
as-you-go pension scheme is determined by average participation rates (in our model: li
t and
li
t+1), average wages (Wi
t and Wi
t+1), and the dependency ratio (αm and αf), modiﬁed by
potential changes of the contribution rate (τt+1 against τt). But as li is always a cohort-wide
average in this calculation, ρ can safely be taken to be given for each insured individual.
9(2002). This paper includes an empirical assessment on which we can build in
the following,
Formally speaking, within the framework of the model developed in section




t ,a s s u m i n g
that the government maximises utility of the average household as represented
in equation (1), taking into account the (abridged) household budget constraint
(2) and the additonal constraint (8) regarding the tax revenue that is required.
Imposing no further restrictions, notably with respect to the form of the utility
function, we obtain a variant of the “Ramsey rule”, one of the most fundamental











According to condition (9), implicit tax rates for (married) women, ϑ
f, should be
higher than those for men, ϑ
m,14 if the (compensated) wage elasticity of female
labour supply, εff, is lower than the corresponding value for males, εmm,a n di f
this relation between “own-price eﬀects” (where the wage elasticity is evaluated
with respect to one’s own wages) is not turned over through a highly inverse
relation of “cross-price eﬀects”, εij with i,j ∈ {m,f}, i 6= j (where the elasticity
of labour supply is measured with respect to the spouse’s wage).15
Assuing, in addition, that the household utility funtion is fully separable
regarding the labour-supply decisions of each partner, implying that the cross-











Here, it is only the ratio of (own-)wage elasticities, εm and εf, that determines
the optimal tax structure. To limit eﬃciency losses arising from labour-supply
responses, the tax rate imposed on the partner whose labour supply is more
elastic should be lower than the tax rate for the partner with a higher elasticity
of labour supply.
But theoretical considerations alone are not suited to clarify what these
optimal-taxation rules actually imply for our problem. Whose labour supply is
typically more elastic with respect to net wages, hence wage taxation — that of
married women or of their husbands — is ultimately an empirical question. In
a paper that was meant to explore a related, yet diﬀering, subject — namely
the question for optimal time-proﬁles of implicit tax rates over individual life
cycles (with more than just one active period) — Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding
(2002) come up with parallel assessments for the labour supply elasticities of
14The transformation to ϑi/(1−ϑi) simply relates the tax rate to net earnings — expressing
it as a proportional surcharge on these.
15Taken in isolation, these cross-price eﬀects have the following impact: implicit tax rates
for females should be higher than those for males if the compensated elasticity of labour supply
of women with respect to their husbands’ wages is lower than the “cross-wage” elasticity of
labour supply of men.
10married females and males. Their results are thus also of high interest in the
current context.
The analysis of labour supply of German males and (married) females con-
ducted in Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding (2002) is based on data collected
through the “German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)” between 1988 and 1997.
Self-employed individuals and civil servants are excluded from the sample as,
under current rules, they are exempted from mandatory membership in the Ger-
man Statutory Pension Scheme. Diﬀerentiated by gender, the data are pooled to
form two sub-samples of “young” and “old” working-age individuals (aged 20—39
and 40—59, respectively). For the present purpose, this allows for a rough, but
meaningful, control for potential cohort eﬀects that may be present especially in
female labour supply decisions. Labour supply is deﬁned in terms of decisions
on working hours, assuming that the more fundamental decision to participate
in the labour market will often be inﬂuenced by other considerations — rigidities
in the length of certain training periods for younger individuals, the supply of
child-care facilities for females, options to exit from the labour market and retire
early for older workers, etc. The econometric estimate is based on the standard
two-stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979), where ﬁrst a (gross) wage
equation is estimated to impute wages for those who are not actually working,
then a Tobit model (after Tobin 1958) for the unbiased labour supply function
based on changes in net earnings.16
Building on the coeﬃcients of this estimate — in particular, those for the net
wage associated with an extra-hour of work and for other household income17
— one can calculate the compensated wage elasticities of married women and
men through a Slutsky decomposition of observable, uncompensated wage elas-
ticities.18 Table 1 summarises the main results, comparing wage elasticities of
labour supply for married females and males and confronting them with average
implicit tax rates for “young” (“y”) and “old” (“o”) individuals of working age
(in the relevant period of time) that can be derived from the simulations for
ﬁgure 2.
It turns out that, in both age categories, labour supply of married women
is much higher than that of men at the same age. This is most apparent for
young individuals aged 20—39, where male labour supply appears to next to be
non-responsive to wages. For older individuals aged 40—59, the wage elasticity
of male labour supply increases more against the parallel ﬁgure for the young
than it does in the case of married women. Still, it remains well below the
wage elasticity of females of the same age. All in all, the result that labour
16For a comprehensive description of the data set and the methods applied, together with a
fuller documentation of the results, see Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding (2002, sections 4 and
5).
17In the context of an overall progressive tax system, a potential endogeneity problem
arises with respect to how net earnings and net wage rates are determined. This problem
is circumvented through evaluating the relevant ﬁgures at group-speciﬁc averages of working
hours and an increase of the latter by an hour per week. (The relevant sub-groups are formed
based on correspondance with respect to gender, age, education, job experience, and the
number of children living in the household.)
18See Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding (2002, section 6).
11supply decisions of women are much more responsive to wages than those of
men neither appears to be mainly driven by cohort eﬀects nor by life-cycle
eﬀects.19 In addition, it conforms with the results of a multitude of earlier
studies covering Germany and other indutrialised countries.20
Table 1: The structure of implicit taxes
and inverted wage elasticities for married females and males
Married females Males
a) “young” individuals (aged 20—39)
εf
y =0 .543 *** εm
y =0 .041 ***
ϑ
f
y =1 2 .86% ϑ
m




















b) “old” individuals (aged 40—59)
εf
o =0 .809 *** εm
o =0 .236 ***
ϑ
f
o =1 0 .56% ϑ
m
















*** denotes signiﬁcance of the results at a
1-percent level.
Looking at implicit tax rates involved in the German Statutory Pension
Scheme, table 1 reveals that these are not even higher for the birth cohorts of
women actually considered than those for males in the same age categories. (The
youngest individuals included in the sample for the econometric estimates were
born in 1977; ﬁgure 2 shows that the gender tax gap tends to widen considerably
only afterwards.) But, in any case, the ratio of the relevant tax rates (per net
wage earnings) for females vs males is far from what would appear to be optimal
to take care of the huge diﬀerences in labour-supply reactions. In the case of
younger individuals, this ratio would have to be adjusted by a factor of 13, in
the case of older individuals by a factor of 3.2, in favour of married women in
order to bring it in line with the simple inverse-elasticities rule (10).
It might eﬀectively over-burden the results presented here to derive an “op-
timal” structure of implicit tax rates in a quantitatively exact fashion. For this
kind of purpose, the empirical design is certainly a bit too rough. Also, alterna-
tive approaches to household-level decision making are neglected here (and, cor-
respondingly, cross-wage elasticities of each partner’s labour supply that could
19This is conﬁrmed by a series of more diﬀerentiated estimates for sub-groups of 5 age
cohorts each that are also reported in Fenge, Übelmesser and Werding (2003, tables 7a and
7b).
20The estimates provided by Franz (1985), Strøm and Wagenhals (1991) or Untiedt (1992)
focus on female labour supply; they support that wage elasticities of women are cinsiderably
high, but do not allow for comparisons with those of men. The studies by Buslei and Steiner
(1999) or Kaltenborn (2000) clearly conﬁrm our results. For a comparative survey of parallel
results obtained for other countries, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
12diﬀer from zero are ignored). Furthermore, we only look at implicit taxes in-
volved in the pension system, not at other taxes imposed on wage earnings.
(Note, however, that the German “splitting” approach to jointly taxing a mar-
ried couple’s income involves higher tax rates for second earners — mostly women
— than for typical breadwinner-males (see, for instance, Ott 1993; or Zameck
1997). But what our results should be taken to indicate is that the gender-
speciﬁc structure of implicit taxes involved in pay-as-you-go pension schemes
are most likely to violate fundamental rules of optimal taxation and that this
is mainly a by-product of how survivor beneﬁts are currently being assessed,
or how they interact with the survivor’s own, non-derived pension entitlements.
This problem could even become more pressing to the extent that women show
increasing rates of labour-force participation, while the gender wage gap is clos-
ing over time. Instead of letting implicit tax rates imposed on married women
rise with these trends — as they would do automatically under current rules —
they should rather be reduced below the comparable tax rates for men. (Only,
we would possibly over-state our case if we wanted to say by how much.)
4 Options for reforming survivor beneﬁts
The eﬃciency problems highlighted in the preceding sections are mainly due to
t h ef a c tt h a ts u r v i v o rb e n e ﬁts usually substitute for pension entitlements that
are based on the survivor’s own contributions. If, under current socio-economic
conditions, survivor beneﬁts are also less and less justiﬁed by distributional ob-
jectives, abolishing them might appear to be a natural solution.21 Compared to
the status quo, a solution of this kind implies ﬁnancial losses in terms of a given
couple’s joint beneﬁt entitlements if, according to the distinction introduced in
section2, the wive belongs to “case 1”. There would be no such loss in “case
2” if the diﬀerent types of beneﬁts would oﬀ-set each other on a one-for-one
basis. Since part of the beneﬁts is often exempted from the reduction, and since
reduction rates can be smaller than 100%, total beneﬁt entitlements would also
decrease for case-2 households if survivor beneﬁts were wiped out. On the other
hand, these losses for married couples may eﬀectively indicate that an out-dated
type of extra-beneﬁts is abolished, allowing for reductions in the pension sys-
tem’s budget. In any case, abolishing survivor pensions implies that net wages











































t because αf > αm.
21As they are not aﬀected by the criticisms raised here, this conclusion need not apply to
survivor pension paid to partners of working age who are prevented from (full) labour-force
participation through child-care obligations, at least on a transitory basis.
13As long as life expectancies of women are higher than those of men, the ratio
of the implicit tax rates they are faced with would unambiguously move in
a direction that should lead to smaller welfare losses in the light of standard
estimates regarding the diﬀerences in wage elasticities of female vs male labour
supply. When assessed by the strict inverse-elasticity rule as stated in section
3, the solution is not necessarily optimal. But we already said that one should
be reluctant to take the simulations and estimates presented here as a precise
yardstick for the reforms that are necessary.
Fully individualising beneﬁt entitlements for married spouses cannot be
achieved without approporiate transition periods. Otherwise, the reforms could
annihilate life-cycle planning of married couples, especially of female partners
in marriages with a traditional division of labour, at a very late stage with-
out giving those aﬀected the time to respond to the new framework through
behavioural changes. If individuals have failed to build up suﬃcient pension
entitlements of their own from the very beginning, it is diﬃcult to make up
for that already when it is still some time to go until retirement age. Grant-
ing higher pension beneﬁts to women whose individual beneﬁt entitlements are
small because of parental leaves — a requirement deﬁned by the German Court
of Justice with respect to any future pension reform since 1992 — may solve this
problem partially but not fully.22
Another, more important shortcoming of this type of a solution is that the
resulting time proﬁle of household income over the periods of joint retirement
a n ds u r v i v o r h o o d—w h i c hi sw h e nt h es u rviving spouse has to live on his own
beneﬁt entitlements only even if they are rather small — may not at all correspond
t oap r o ﬁle that is optimal with respect to the timing of goods consumption,
or the relevant inter-temporal substitution elasticities. Instead, current income
in the period of survivorhood will typically be too small when compared to the
sum of a couple’s individual beneﬁt entitlements received earlier on.
Part of the German pension reform enacted in 2001 is the option of con-
tinously splitting invidual pension entitlements between the two partners on a
50-to-50 basis (for couples who married after 1 January 2001, or where both
spouses were born after 1 January 1962). At the same time, couples who use
this option have to give up entitlements for receiving survivor beneﬁts. A conse-
quence of this solution, if it were chosen by a large number of households, is that
part of the potential reductions in pension expenditure through the abolishment
of survivor beneﬁts will not materialise because entitlements will typically be
transferred from males — with higher life-time earnings but lower life expectancy
— to their wives. Apart from that, the splitting option would also be a step to-
wards removing the eﬃciency loss indicated by our results presented in section
3 as it fully equalises the implicit tax rates for married females and their hus-
22The solution suggested in the remainder of this paper is thus open to being augmented
by additional changes in the way child-rearing activities are reﬂected in individual pension
entitlements. For proposals of this kind for the German Statutory Pension Scheme, see Sinn
and Werding (2002; 2005).
14bands.23 A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h er e s u l t i n gt i m ep r o ﬁle of household income during
the full retirement period — with a 100-to-50 ratio between beneﬁt entitlements
during the sub-periods of joint survival and survivorhood, respectively — may
still not correspond to an optimal time path of the household’s consumption.
Existing rules for the deﬁnition of survivor beneﬁts are mainly based on factors
(for the conversion of beneﬁt entitlements of defunct spouses into survivor ben-
eﬁts) between 50 and 60%, additionally exempting part of the survivor’s own
entitlements from being reduced in return.24 In any case, a simple splitting
model may be too rigid in the allocation of the pooled beneﬁt entitlements of
a given couple both to the prtners and over time. Even a model with variable
splitting factors, where spouses can freely choose how much of their beneﬁt
entitlements to transfer between them may not be suited to insure the basic
biometrical risks — which of the partners will outlive the other and by how long?
— on which the problem of an adequate provision for survivors ultmately rests.
A solution that is superior in terms of the ﬂexibility of re-allocating indi-
vidual beneﬁt entitlements, the insurance of relevant life-expectancy risks, as
well as the ﬁscal costs is given by a joint annuitisation of a given couple’s in-
dividual beneﬁt entitlements. Irrespective of the actual time proﬁle of beneﬁt
payments, providing for a partner with lower beneﬁt entitlements who is most
likely to live longer than the other can in principle also be accomplished through
making private savings or through buying appropriate life-insurance cover. But
“framing” these kinds of decisions through some sort of public provision, linked
to a mandatory pension system, may nonetheless be to the advantage of many
individuals — especially if this can be arranged for in a simple and cost-saving
way. To the extent that this contributes to consumption proﬁles with higher
utility levels, and helps avoiding cases of under-provision, oﬀering such a scheme
could lead to genuine welfare gains.
The basic idea behind the solution to be sketched here is that, applying
actuarial principels and without granting any extra-beneﬁts for survivors, the
present value of a married couple’s pooled beneﬁt entitlements can be shifted
rather freely between the sub-periods of joint retirement and expected survivor-
hood. Compared to the case where beneﬁt entitlements are fully individualised,
beneﬁts paid out while both partners are still alive would have to be reduced by
a certain margin, in order to top up pension beneﬁts for the survivant spouse.
In both sub-periods, public pensions could then cover an equivalent share of cur-
rent consumption, ﬁrst of the couple, then of the single survivor. If individual
beneﬁt entitlements, the age of each partner (and, hence, contingent life ex-
pectancies) are given, a solution of this kind can be realised through the simple













t =( 1− ϑt)Wi
t
24See Fenge et al. (2003, table 1.15). In Germany, the conversion factor is currently 55%,
as was mentioned in section 2. Until 2000, it was 60% and, on average, the most recent
reduction is oﬀ-set by higher exemptions for own beneﬁt entitlements of survivors who have
raised children.
15choice of just one parameter that governs the relevant deductions and top-ups
at each point in time. If the pool of risks is large enough, insurance against de-
viations of individual life expectancies and the actual sequence of deaths from
what had to be expected can be easily provided.
The core parameter of the joint-annuitisation model we have in mind is a
deduction rate δ by which beneﬁts actually paid out during joint survival are
reduced, thus allowing for higher beneﬁt payments to the survivor later on.
The present value of total expected beneﬁts of a given couple has to remain
unchanged against a scenario where beneﬁt entitlements are purely individual.
This implies that the incentive eﬀects of joint annuitisation with respect to
each partner’s labour-supply decisions are the same as those associated with
equations (11) and (12).
Within the framework developed in section 2 — where life expectancies of
males and females were taken to be ﬁxed and the time structure was generally
modelled in a rough fashion only — shifting beneﬁt entitlements between the
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By the choice of δ, the increase in pension beneﬁts during the period of survivor-
hood, αf − αm, exactly corresponds to the deduction accepted by the partners
during their joint retirement period, αm, on present-value terms.
Now, how should δ be chosen in order to establish the partners’ preferred
time proﬁle of current beneﬁt payments over the full retirement period? Ob-
viously, this is dependent of the relative size of their individual beneﬁt entitle-
ments as well the actual diﬀerence between their contingent life expectancies at
the moment of joint annuitisation. Based on equation (13), but correcting for
the expected length of the relevant sub-periods to estimate the relative size of





















αf − αm (14)
Assuming that beneﬁts are jointly annuitised when both partners (simultane-
ously) enter retirement and plugging in for the αis actual values for the average
16duration of pension beneﬁts paid to men and women in the German Statutory
Pension Scheme (as of 2002),25 table 2 shows the results for π (ratio of beneﬁts
paid to the survivor over beneﬁts paid to the couple during joint survival) as
a function of the relative amounts of (life-time) earnings, hence beneﬁt entitle-
ments, and alternative choices regarding the deduction rate δ.I tt u r n so u tt h a t
relatively small deductions during joint survival are suﬃcient to ensure a rela-
tive level of pension beneﬁts that corresponds to what current rules for survivor
beneﬁts are meant to provide for (π ≥ 60% being the target level, it appears,
irrespective of whether the survivant spouse holds own beneﬁt entitlements or
not). That it is the easier to get into this range of πs the higher individual
beneﬁt entitlements of the surviving partner are should not be surprising.
T a b l e2 :R e l a t i v el e v e lo fb e n e ﬁts for survivors (π)
δ =
Wflf/Wmlm 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.1 0.15
0.00 8.9% 18.3% 28.2% 38.6% 61.3%
0.25 29.4% 39.3% 49.8% 60.8% 84.9%
0.50 43.1% 53.4% 64.2% 75.7% 100.6%
0.75 52.9% 63.4% 74.5% 86.2% 111.8%
1.00 60.2% 70.9% 82.2% 94.2% 120.2%
In reality, there are a number of additional complications for the solution
sketched here to be workable that are not covered by the simpliﬁed model de-
v e l o p e di ns e c t i o n2 .F i r s t ,t h ep a r t n e r sc o u l dr e t i r ea td i ﬀerent points in time.
Basically, (outstanding) pension entitlements of a married couple can jointly
annuitised at any point in time during their retirement phase. The eﬀect of
δ becomes weaker the shorter contingent life expectancy of the partner who is
likely to die ﬁrst. But in principle, the re-assessment of beneﬁts can be done
when the ﬁrst of the spouses enters retirement as well as when the second one
retires.
Second, life expectancy of females is higher than that of males in all industri-
alised countries, and married women are typically younger than their husbands
almost everywhere. Still, in individual cases it is perfectly possible that it is the
man who lives longer than his wife. If joint annuitisation were only made in the
light of the opposite case, this could lead to an over-provision for the surviving
husband. In terms of distributional objectives, this is certainly less of a problem
than potential under-provision — for instance, because the latter may give rise to
other beneﬁt entitlements that could have been avoided if provisions had been
made in good time. On the other hand, the time proﬁle of retirement income
that has been chosen, through δ, based on expectation values may be missed
25In West-Germany, the corresponding value for males is 14.6 years, for females 18.8 years
(see Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger, 2003, 133).
17and a sub-optimal structure of consumption over the full retirement period may
be the consequence. But if mortality rates are known for both partners, the
choice of δ can be translated into a choice of the relative level of beneﬁts, π,o r
a choice of the time proﬁle of paying out pm0
t+1 + p
f0
t+1 which is then considered
the true objective of insurance. Irrespective of the actual sequence of deaths,
this preferred proﬁle could then be established under any realisation of the risks
insured.
Third, the retirement period also has a certain length and time structure, a
feature that is captured by our model only in a very rough fashion. In reality,
the question arises which discount rate should be used for assessing relevant
present values: the capital-market rate of interest (adjusted for a risk premium
associated with an insurance of longevity risks) or, more in line with how a
pay-as-you-go scheme is actually operated, the pension scheme’s internal rate
of return? By actuarial standards, the ﬁrst of these options is certainly more
appropriate. In any case, it is the only solution that is really neutral with
respect to the choice of the timing of beneﬁtp a y m e n t s .
In a related context, with respect to the deﬁnition of “actuarially” fair re-
ductions of pension beneﬁts in cases of early retirement, it is sometimes argued
that calculating these reductions using the internal rate of return as the relevant
discount rate would yield results by which the eﬀective retirement age becomes
neutral with respect to a pay-as-you-go pension system’s budget,26 while using
the market rate of interest would imply higher reductions of beneﬁts, hence
reductions of total pension expenditure. Conversely, turning regular old-age
pensions into top-ups for survivors at a market interest rate could then imply
that, when aggregated over time, total pension expenditure increases — at least,
top-ups paid during the survivorhood period are higher than earlier deductions
by a rate that exceeds the fundamental growth rate of the pension budget.
We have already explained that, perhaps following a certain period of transi-
tion, abolishing traditional survivor beneﬁts should deﬁnitely reduce total pen-
sion expenditure. If, in addition, paying out part of the individual beneﬁt
entitlements of married spouses were postponed until the period of survivor-
hood of just one partner, there is a further, transitory reduction in expenditure
which, on present-value terms, is exactly oﬀ-set by higher expenditure later
on. It would therefore appear a natural solution to channel these transitory
reductions into a special “survivors’ reserve” (not into transitory reductions of
contribution rates or transitory increases in beneﬁt levels) in order to actually
pre-fund for the beneﬁt entitlements that are simply becoming eﬀective with
a delay. If this is how the scheme were operated, jointly annuitising pension
beneﬁt entitlements of married couples on an actuarial basis, at a discount rate
derived from the capital-market rate of interest, should not cause any budgetary
problems. There may be some additional complications that realistically would
have to be taken into account, but basically the simple model developed in this
paper just needs to be augmented by a little more time structure — in years, not
rough periods and sub-periods, thus capable of oﬀering a more detailed picture
26See, for instance, Ohsmann, Stolz and Thiede (2003).
18of what can happen to the household and how this can be dealt with in terms of
accumulating, transferring and decumulating both spouses’ beneﬁt entitlements
— to make it operative for real-world applications.
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